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IGNORANCE OF THE LAW: SHOULD IT EXCUSE
VIOLATIONS OF CERTAIN FEDERAL
RESTRICTIONS ON THE POSSESSION
OF FIREARMS?
THOMAS L. FOWLER1
Are thousands of North Carolinians violating federal criminal law
every day without knowing it even though such violations may subject
them to imprisonment for up to ten years and a fine of up to
$250,000?2 Ignorance of the law is generally held not to excuse crimi-
nal conduct,3 but can such ignorance ever be so reasonable4 and pre-
dictable as to constitute a legitimate excuse? Are some laws so
obscure, technical, counter-intuitive,9 or hard to discover 6 that igno-
rance of the law will be a defense?
1. Associate Counsel, North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts,
Raleigh, North Carolina. B.A., 1975, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D.,
1980, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The opinions expressed in this
article are solely those of the author and do not represent any position or policy of the
Administrative Office of the Courts. A version of this article appeared in the North
Carolina Bar Journal (Winter 2001).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
3. "The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to
criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system." Cheek v. United
States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991). "[It is axiomatic that 'ignorance or mistake of law
will not excuse an act in violation of the criminal laws.' 21 AmJur.2d, Criminal Law
142, p. 278 (1981). See also 22 CJ.S., Criminal Law 48 (1961). Therefore, defendant's
claim is legally without basis (as well as being utterly preposterous) because ignorance
of the law is not a valid defense." State v. Rogers, 68 N.C. App. 358, 385, 315 S.E.2d
492, cert. denied, 311 N.C. 767, 319 S.E.2d 284 (1984).
4. "Thus, although ignorance of the law is no excuse, and the statute at issue does
not require the State to prove intent, due process requires that defendant have
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the statutory requirements before he can be
charged with its violation." State v. Young, 140 N.C. App. 1, 12, 535 S.E.2d 380
(2000).
5. "[A] law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the
average member of the community would be too severe for that community to bear."
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, at 50 (1881). See also Bruce R. Grace,
Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1392 (November, 1986): "The
principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse, long thought to be basic to criminal
law, is no longer appropriate when criminal law applies in surprising ways to
otherwise ordinary behavior."
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I. SECTION 922(G) OF THE FEDERAL GUN CONTROL ACT
18 U.S.C. Section 922(g) makes it unlawful for certain designated
classes of individuals "to ship or transport in interstate or foreign com-
merce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammuni-
tion; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped
or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." Among the classes
of prohibited firearms possessors are persons who have been convicted
of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.7
It may be widely known that convicted felons are barred from possess-
ing firearms.8 Also barred, however, are the following classes of indi-
viduals: (1) persons who have been convicted of a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence;9 (2) persons who are subject to certain domestic
violence protective orders,1" and (3) persons who have been commit-
ted to a mental institution." Persons in these classes may be less likely
to know that they are subject to federal firearms disabilities. 12
A. Section 922(g)(9): Possession of firearm by person who has been
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
Known as the Lautenberg Amendment,13 this provision defines a
"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" to mean an offense that is a
6. "While it is generally said that ignorance of the law is no excuse for a failure to
comply with the law, such a rule does not apply where the citizen is, as a matter of
practicality, denied a reasonable means for finding out what the law is in the first
place." Orange County v. Dept. of Trans., 46 N.C. App. 350, 377, 265 S.E.2d 890, disc.
rev. denied, 301 N.C. 94 (1980).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 9 2 2 (g)(1).
8. The Gun Control Act of 1968's prohibition of convicted felons, and others,
from buying or owning a gun, was the first federal legislation to limit an individual's
Second Amendment right to bear arms. See discussion in Jodi L. Nelson, The
Lautenberg Amendment: An Essential Tool For Combatting Domestic Violence, 74 N.D. L.
Rev. 365, 370-71 (1999).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 92 2 (g)(9). This provision is generally known as the Lautenberg
Amendment to the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968. It was contained in the Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-52 (1996).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 9 2 2 (g)(8). This provision was enacted as part of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 (1994).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). This provision was included in the original Gun
Control Act of 1968.
12. Section 9 2 2 (g)(8 ) and (9) had their genesis in protecting women from domestic
violence. For a general discussion of the federal laws affecting domestic violence
matters, e.g. The Gun Control Act of 1968, The Violence Against Women Act, and the
purpose of the Lautenberg Amendment, see Jodi L. Nelson, The Lautenberg
Amendment: An Essential Tool For Combatting Domestic Violence, 74 N.D. L. Rev. 365
(1999).
13. See footnote 9, supra.
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misdemeanor under federal or state law and has, as an element, the
use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a
deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or
guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a
child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited
with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person simi-
larly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.14 Case law
has held that the predicate misdemeanor crime need not be explicitly
identified as related to domestic violence. 15 Thus while proof of a
domestic relationship is required to successfully prosecute a Section
922(g)(9) action, the predicate misdemeanor must have only one ele-
ment: the use or attempted use of physical force or the threatened use
of a deadly weapon. Simple assault and disorderly conduct convic-
tions might, with additional proof, suffice as misdemeanor crimes of
domestic violence under the Lautenberg Amendment. 16
A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of a mis-
demeanor crime of domestic violence unless the person was repre-
sented by counsel (or knowingly and intelligently waived counsel), the
case was tried by a jury (if entitled to a jury trial), or unless the person
knowingly and intelligently waived the right to have the case tried by a
14. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A).
15. United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 619-21 (8th Cir. 1999). See also United
States v. Ball, an unpublished per curiam opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals, 4th
Circuit, 2001 WL 324624, 246 F.3d 668 (Table) (No. 00-4582, decided April 4, 2001):
"Finally, defendant argued that he had not committed the requisite predicate offense-
a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence," as defined in Section 921(a)(33)(A)
because he was convicted under a West Virginia statute that did not require the battery
to be against a current or former spouse. The Court held that even if defendant was
convicted of simple battery rather than domestic battery as defined by West Virginia
statutes, "we find that his conviction for simple battery meets the § 921 definition.
Section 921(a)(33)(A) requires the predicate offense to have only one element-the use
or attempted use of physical force; the relationship between perpetrator and victim
need not appear in the formal definition of the predicate offense. United States v.
Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1313-14 (11th Cir.2000); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d
215, 218-21 (1st Cir.1999); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 619-21 (8th
Cir. 1999). Because [defendant] committed a battery against his wife, the district court
did not err in finding, as a matter of law, that [defendant] had been convicted of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence."
16. "Did you know that if your client faces charges of misdemeanor battery or
disorderly conduct in a domestic violence situation, a conviction may mean that he or
she may never legally possess a firearm?" Assistant U.S. Attorney Laura A.
Przybylinski Finn, Those Convicted of Domestic Violence Cannot Possess Firearms,
Wisconsin Lawyer (August, 1999). United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215 (1st Cir.
1999) (defendant's state misdemeanor conviction for assaulting his spouse, under
general assault and battery statute, was misdemeanor crime of domestic violence).
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jury, by guilty plea or otherwise. 7 The prohibition applies to persons
convicted of such misdemeanors at any time, even if the conviction
occurred prior to the new law's effective date of September 30, 1996.18
There is no ex post facto violation because the Lautenberg Amendment
does not provide for additional punishment for the misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence. Instead Section 922(g)(9) creates a new
crime, i.e., the crime of being a domestic violence misdemeanant in
possession of a firearm after the 1996 effective date of the Lautenberg
Amendment.1 9
Does a guilty plea to a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
followed by entry of a prayer for judgment continued (PJC) constitute a
"conviction" as that term is used in Section 922(g)(9)? I have located
no case law that answers this question. North Carolina courts have
found, however, that, at least for certain statutes, a guilty plea followed
by a PJC can constitute a "conviction. ' 20  This interpretation also
appears to be supported by the position of the Bureau of Alcohol,
17. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(i).
18. See Robert F. Nicolais, State and Federal Statutes Affecting Domestic Violence
Cases Recognize Dangers of Firearms, New York State Bar Journal (November, 1999).
See also the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms home page (http://
www.atf.treas.gov/); Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence: Questions and
Answers Section (http://www.atf.treas.gov/firearms/domestic/qa.htm): "2. What is
the effective date of this disability? The law was effective September 30, 1996.
However, the prohibition applies to persons convicted of such misdemeanors at any
time, even if the conviction occurred prior to the new law's effective date."
19. United States v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir. 1999), cert denied, 121 S.
Ct. 123 (2000); United States v. Hicks, 992 F. Supp. 1244 (D. Kansas, 1997).
20. See State v. Hatcher, 136 N.C. App. 524, 527, 524 S.E.2d 815 (2000)
("Defendant next contends the court erred in computing his prior record level points
by assessing points for an offense to which he pled no contest and for which prayer for
judgment was continued. "A person has a prior conviction when, on the date a
criminal judgment is entered, the person being sentenced has been previously
convicted of a crime ... " N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.11 (7) (1997). "For the purpose
of imposing sentence, a person has been convicted when he has been adjudged guilty
or has entered a plea of guilty or no contest." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1331(b) (1997).
We have interpreted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1331(b) to mean that formal entry of
judgment is not required in order to have a conviction. State v. Fuller, 48 N.C. App.
418, 268 S.E.2d 879, disc. review denied, 301 N.C. 403, 273 S.E.2d 448 (1980).
Consequently, we conclude that defendant was convicted of the prior offense when he
entered the plea of no contest even though no final judgment had been entered. This
assignment of error is overruled."); see also State v. Hasty, 133 N.C. App. 563, 572,
516 S.E.2d 428 (1999) ("Our Supreme Court has also held that an entry of "prayer for
judgment continued" following a plea of guilty by a criminal defendant may amount to
a "conviction." State v. Sidberry, 337 N.C. 779, 782, 448 S.E.2d 798, 800-01 (1994).
See also Britt v. North Carolina Sheriffs' Educ. And Training Stds. Comm'n, 348 N.C.
573, 576-77, 501 S.E.2d 75, 77 (1998) (holding that plea of no contest followed by
286
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Tobacco and Firearms, as revealed in its "Misdemeanor Crime of Domes-
tic Violence: Questions and Answers" Section on its home page on the
Internet.2
1
In federal prosecutions under Section 922(g)(9), defendants have
based defenses on many grounds, including: (1) unconstitutional exer-
cise of Commerce Clause; (2) unconstitutional interference with Sec-
ond Amendment right to bear arms; and (3) unconstitutional invasion
of state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment (by forcing states to
enforce a federal regulatory program). For the most part, these argu-
ments have been rejected by federal case law-but the arguments are
not implausible and have received some judicial support. Further dis-
cussion of these matters is, however, beyond the scope of this article.22
issuance of a prayer for judgment was a "conviction" for purposes of provisions of the
North Carolina Administrative Code governing the certification of police officers).").
21. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms home page (http://
www.atf.treas.gov/); Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence: Questions and
Answers Section (http://www.atf.treas.gov/firearms/domestic/qa.htm): "12. In
determining whether a conviction in a State court is a "conviction" of a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence, does Federal or State law apply? State law applies. If a
conviction for a qualifying misdemeanor does not occur under State law, the person
has not been "convicted" of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The law states
that a person must be convicted of a State misdemeanor to be under firearms
disabilities. Therefore, if the State does not consider the person to be convicted, the
person would not have Federal firearms disabilities. 13. Is a person who received
"probation before judgment" or some other type of deferred adjudication subject to
this disability? What is a conviction is determined by the law of the jurisdiction in which
the proceedings were held. If the State law where the proceedings were held does not
consider probation before judgement or deferred adjudication to be a conviction, the
person would not be subject to Federal firearms disabilities." (emphasis added).
22. For a detailed discussion of the Commerce Clause analysis, see Polly McCann
Prundea, The Lautenberg Amendment: Congress Hit The Mark By Banning Firearms From
Domestic Violence Offenders, 30 St. Mary's LJ. 801 (1999). For a federal judge's
opinion that Section 922(g)(9) violates the Second Amendment, see United States v.
Emerson, 46 F. Supp.2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999); but see contra United States v. Napier,
233 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2000). In an opinion filed as this article was going to print, the
Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that the Second Amendment does
protect individual's right to keep and bear arms, but that the rights protected by the
Second Amendment are subject to reasonable restrictions. The Court of Appeals held
that the prosecution of Emerson for possessing the firearm while subject to the order
entered in the Texas divorce action did not violate the Second Amendment. United
States v. Emerson, __ F. 3d - (5th Cir., Oct. 16, 2001). For a case that finds no federal
mandate that states assist in the regulation and enforcement of § 9 22(g)(9), see
Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 13 F. Supp. 811 (S.D. Ind. 1998). For a discussion of
all these issues, see Comment, Closing The Loopholes In Domestic Violence Laws: The
Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. Section 92 2 (g)(9), 19 Pace L. Rev. 445 (1999).
20011 287
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This article will focus on the due process and notice issue, i.e., whether
ignorance of the law can constitute an excuse.
B. Section 9 22(g)(8): Possession of Firearm While Subject to Order of
Protection
Section 92 2 (g)(8) prohibits persons subject to certain state protec-
tion orders from possessing firearms. 23 For this section to apply, the
state protection order: (1) must have been issued after an evidentiary
hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which
such person had an opportunity to participate; (2) must have ordered
such person restrained from harassing, stalking, or threatening an inti-
mate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or per-
son, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner
in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and (3) must
have included a finding that such person represents a credible threat to
the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or by its terms
explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physi-
cal force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably
be expected to cause bodily injury.24 The term "intimate partner"
means, with respect to a person, the spouse of the person, a former
spouse of the person, an individual who cohabits or has cohabited
with the person (as long as the parties cohabited as spouses) and an
individual who is the parent of a child of the person.25 Compare these
provisions with those findings and conclusions on AOC Form 306,
"Domestic Violence Protective Order." Does a North Carolina DVPO
qualify as a Section 92 2 (g)(8) order of protection? 26 The penalty for a
23. The term "firearm" means (1) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will
or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an
explosive, (2) the frame or receiver of any such weapon, (3) any firearm muffler or
firearm silencer or (4) any destructive device. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(32).
26. One expert recommends that court officials review their state's domestic
violence protection order to determine "if it conforms with the federal requirements"
as stated in § 92 2 (g)(8). She continues: "Please note if your jurisdiction's protection
order contains a discretionary firearm ban. If so, even if the order complies with the
federal law, failure of the state court to preclude possession and to put the defendant
on notice of a possible violation for possessing a firearm while the order is in effect,
may make federal prosecution difficult .... [P]lease refer any questions about the
applicability of this statute to the United States Attorney's Office in your district."
Margaret S. Groban, Violence Against Women Act Specialist, Executive Office for U.S.
Attorneys, Department of Justice, "The Federal Domestic Violence Laws and the
Enforcement of These Laws" (November 2000).
[Vol. 23:283
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violation of Section 922(g)(8) is a maximum prison term of ten years,
a $250,000 fine, or both.27
C. Section 9 22(g)(4): Possession of firearm by person who has been
committed to a mental institution.
Federal regulations define the term "committed to a mental insti-
tution" to mean a "formal commitment of a person to a mental institu-
tion by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority. The
term includes a commitment to a mental institution involuntarily. The
term includes a commitment for mental defectiveness or mental ill-
ness. It also includes commitments for other reasons, such as drug
use. The term does not include a person in a mental institution for
observation or a voluntary admission to a mental institution. ' 28
In United States v. Midgett,29 the defendant entered a conditional
guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a person previously commit-
ted to a mental institution, a violation of Section 92 2 (g)(4). On appeal,
defendant argued that his previous confinement at a state mental hos-
pital was not a commitment as contemplated by Section 9 2 2 (g)(4).
The previous confinement was not an involuntary civil commitment
but an inquiry ordered by a judge into defendant's competency to
stand trial on criminal charges and whether defendant could be
restored to competency. After a two month stay at the mental hospital,
the physicians concluded that defendant was mentally ill, not restor-
able to competency but also not dangerous to himself or others, and
capable of taking care of himself. Defendant was released from the
hospital.3 ° The federal Court of Appeals held that Section 92 2(g)(4)
was not limited to formal involuntary civil commitment procedures
27. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
28. 27 C.F.R. 178.11.
29. 198 F.3d 143 (4th Cir., 1999). Compare United States v. Chamberlain, 159
F.3d 656 (First Circuit, decided Nov. 3, 1998): "Determination of whether defendant
was "committed," within meaning of federal statute proscribing possession of firearm
by person who has been "committed to a mental institution," is question of federal
law." "Defendant's preliminary five-day emergency "involuntary admission" to mental
hospital pursuant to Maine law, after he had put loaded gun to his head and
threatened his wife, was a "commitment" sufficient to support defendant's subsequent
federal conviction for possession of firearm by person who had been "committed to a
mental institution"; "commitment" did not require provision of counsel, full-blown
adversary hearing, finding by clear and convincing evidence that person suffered from
mental illness, or judicial order of commitment."
30. As a consequence of the psychiatrist's report, the criminal charges against the
defendant were not pursued. At a later date, the defendant contacted the Secret
Service to inform them that he was the target of a conspiracy by the Masons. During
an interview with defendant, agents discovered various weapons in defendant's
20011 289
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but included defendant's confinement at the hospital even though he
was found not dangerous to himself or others. The Court noted that
defendant had been examined by a competent mental health practi-
tioner and had been represented by counsel, factual findings were
made by a judge who heard evidence, the judge concluded defendant
was in need of inpatient hospital care and issued an order committing
defendant to a mental institution, and defendant was actually confined
there. The Court concluded: "We are confident that our interpretation
of the term 'commitment' is consistent with federal policy relating to
the possession of firearms as contemplated in 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(4).
Given [defendant's] proven history of mental instability, he is
undoubtedly in that class of person 'who by reason of their status,'
Congress considered too dangerous to possess guns."
II. U.S. V. HANCOCK, U.S. v. NAPIER, AND U.S. v. BEAVERS
Consider the case of Gary Hancock, a resident of Arizona. Han-
cock legally purchased several firearms in the early 1980's and kept
them in his home "solely for sporting or collection purposes."'3 1 In the
early 1990's Hancock was convicted of several state misdemeanors
involving violence or threats of violence against his wife. Hancock's
sentences for these convictions included fines and probation but he
was never required to surrender possession of his firearms and such
surrender was not required by the applicable laws in effect at that time.
But in 1998 the government charged Hancock 32 with violating Secti6n
922(g)(9) because he had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence and was in possession of firearms after September
30, 1996. At trial, Hancock was convicted.
On appeal, Hancock argued that he had not knowingly violated
Section 922(g)(9) because he had legally purchased the firearms, he
had legally possessed the firearms up until 1996, he was unaware of
Section 92 2(g)(9) until he was arrested for violating it (this was not
disputed by the government), and the government had failed in its
duty to inform citizens individually of this change in the law. The
Court of Appeals rejected Hancock's arguments.
possession. The weapons were seized and defendant charged with violations of
§ 92 2 (g)(4). Id.
31. United States v. Hancock, 231 F.3d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 2000).
32. Hancock's possession of firearms came to the attention of the authorities only
after Hancock's wife, in July of 1998, obtained a domestic violence protective order
specifying that Hancock was not permitted to possess firearms. Id., at 560.
290 [Vol. 23:283
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The Court stated that the "knowing" requirement in Section
922(g)(9) 33 referred to knowledge of possession rather than the legal
consequences of such possession, i.e., the statute did not require
actual knowledge of the law. The Court also noted that by owning
firearms and by having committed an act or acts of domestic violence,
Hancock had removed himself from the class of ordinary and innocent
citizens who would not expect any special restrictions on their posses-
sion of a firearm. According to the Court, Hancock had "at least some
reason to know that his behavior might, in the future, be subject to
additional regulation relating to such weapons. '34 Finally the Court
held that, as a general proposition, "Congress is not required to inform
citizens individually of a change in the law," and that it is enough to
enact and publish the law.35 Furthermore, the Court noted that Sec-
tion 922(g)(9 ) had received extensive publicity in newspapers across
the state, citing several examples. Hancock's conviction was upheld.
In United States v. Napier,36 the defendant challenged Section
92 2 (g)(8) on due process grounds on its face because it fails to require
notice of its prohibitions, and as applied because he contended he did
not in fact receive notice that his conduct violated federal law. The
defendant argued that Section 922(g)(8) "is a technical, obscure stat-
ute which punishes conduct that a reasonable person ordinarily would
not consider to be criminal."37 The Court rejected this challenge stat-
ing that even if the domestic violence order entered against defendant
did not feature a bold print warning that he could not lawfully possess
firearms, the mere fact that defendant had been made subject to a
domestic violence protection order provided him with notice that his
conduct was subject to increased government scrutiny and it was "not
reasonable for someone in his position to expect to possess dangerous
33. The statutory reference to defendant's knowledge is actually found in the
penalty provision, Section 924(a)(2), which requires that the defendant have
"knowingly" violated Section 9 22(g).
34. Id., at 564-65.
35. Id., at 565.
36. 233 F.3d 394 (U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, Decided: Nov. 21, 2000).
37. In support of this contention, defendant relied on Judge Posner's dissent in
United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280 (7th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1024, 119
S. Ct. 2371, 144 L.Ed.2d 774 (1999), and the determination in United States v.
Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999) that § 922(g)(8) violates the Fifth
Amendment because it is an obscure, highly technical statute with no mens rea
requirement that renders a person subject to prosecution without proof of knowledge
that he was violating the statute. The district court's ruling in Emerson was reversed on
16 October 2001 by the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals. United States v. Emerson, __
F.3d - (5th Cir., 2001).
20011 291
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weapons free from extensive regulation. ' 3 ' The Court also found that
actual notice was not required.
In United States v. Beavers,39 the defendant argued that he should
not be convicted of a Section 922(g)(9) violation not only because he
was unaware of the law but also because the state had authorized the
return of his pistol to his possession after his conviction of a misde-
meanor crime of domestic violence. The Beavers court rejected the
first argument and also held that this state action in returning the pis-
tol did not render the federal prosecution of Beavers unconstitutional
as applied. The Court stated that "the state of Michigan is under no
obligation to update state-law violators on recent additions to federal
law."4 o
III. CHIEF JUDGE RICHARD POSNER WEIGHS IN
But some question may remain as to whether the due process/
notice issue is finally resolved-largely because of the weighty opinion
of a highly respected 4 1 federal Court of Appeals judge.42 In U.S. v.
38. The Napier court also stated: "Every circuit court which has considered a due
process challenge similar to Napier's has rejected it. See, e.g., United States v. Kafka,
222 F.3d 1129, 1131-32 (9th Cir.2000) (no departure from rule that ignorance of the
law is no excuse was warranted because the restraining order transformed the
otherwise "innocent" nature of the defendant's gun possession); United States v.
Reddick, 203 F.3d 767, 769-71 (10th Cir.2000) ("We agree with every circuit court
that has considered due process challenges to § 9 2 2(g)(8) and conclude that due
process does not require actual knowledge of the federal statute."); United States v.
Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 225-26 (1st Cir.1999) (individual under domestic violence
protection order "would not be sanguine about the legal consequences of possessing a
firearm"); United States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 722-23 (4th Cir.1999) ("Like a felon,
a person [subject to a domestic violence protection order] cannot reasonably expect to
be free from regulation when possessing a firearm"); United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d
280, 288-89 (7th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1024, 119 S. Ct. 2371, 144 L.Ed.2d
774 (1999).
39. 206 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 2000) cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1121 (2000)..
40. Id. at 710.
41. Judge Richard Posner has been described as the modern successor of Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr.: "if you can imagine a kinder, gentler, much less restrained, and
even more widely educated Holmes." Robert Henry, The Value(s) of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., The Green Bag, No. 1, Autumn 2001, at page 107. See also Daniel T. Ostas,
Postmodern Economic Analysis of Law: Extending the Pragmatic Visions of Richard A.
Posner, 36 Am. Bus. L.J. 193 (Fall, 1998); Peter F. Lake, Posner's Pragmatist
Jurisprudence, 73 Neb. L. Rev. 545 (1994); Jeffrey Rosen, Overcoming Posner, 105 Yale
L.J. 581 (November 1995) (review of "Overcoming Law," by Richard A. Posner).
42. And to be fair, Judge Posner's analysis also finds support in a string of U.S.
Supreme Court cases: Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); Liparota v. United
States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985); Ratzlof v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994); Staples v.
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Wilson43 the defendant legally possessed several firearms at the time
his wife sought an order of protection from Wilson. A hearing was
held in the judge's chambers that "lasted no more than ten minutes,"
during which time the judge explained the proposed order of protec-
tion to Wilson (who was appearing pro se) and the parties discussed
child support and visitation. Wilson indicated "he did not have a
problem" with any of the terms of the proposed order. Wilson had not
threatened his wife with his firearms, and although state law allowed
the judge to order Wilson to give up his firearms as a part of the pro-
tective order, the judge had not done so.4 4 The judge also did not
inform Wilson of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) which made it illegal for those
subject to a protective order to possess firearms. 45 Wilson was charged
and convicted of violating Section 922(g)(8). The Court of Appeals
rejected Wilson's due process arguments along the lines of the Hancock
and Napier opinions. The Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals filed a dissenting opinion.
Chief Judge Posner stated:
It is wrong to convict a person of a crime if he had no reason to believe
that the act for which he was convicted was a crime, or even that it was
wrongful. ... Congress created, and the Department of Justice sprang,
a trap on Carlton Wilson as a result of which he will serve more than
three years in federal prison for an act (actually a failure to act) that he
could not have suspected was a crime or even a civil wrong....
The fact that the restraining order contained no reference to guns may
have lulled [Wilson] into thinking that, as long as he complied with the
order and stayed away from his wife, he could carry on as before.
United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994); and United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S.
64 (1994). For a masterful synthesis/interpretation of these cases (and a rejection of
the "medieval slogan" that ignorance of the law is no excuse), see John Shepard Wiley,
Jr., Not Guilty By Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability In Federal Criminal Interpretation,
85 Va. L. Rev. 1021 (1999): "A rule of mandatory culpability unites these decisions:
The Court will demand that the government prove moral culpability when statutory
language might reach conduct that is 'not inevitably nefarious'; that is, conduct that is
not inevitably blameworthy." Is gun ownership inevitably nefarious? Those who
think not generally cite the U.S. Supreme Court for the following language: "[Tihere is
a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals in this
country." Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 610 (1994). See also United States v.
Emerson, _ F. 3d _, __ (5th Cir., Oct. 16, 2001)(firearms ownership is not
inherently evil or suspect).
43. 159 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1024, 119 S. Ct. 2371
(1999).
44. Id. at 294.
45. Judge Posner speculates that the judge was unaware of the existence of Section
922(g)(8). Id.
20011 293
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When a defendant is morally culpable for failing to know or guess that
he is violating some law (as would be the case of someone who com-
mitted a burglary without thinking-so warped was his moral sense-
that burglary might be a crime), we rely on conscience to provide all
the notice that is required. Sometimes the existence of the law is com-
mon knowledge .... And sometimes, though the law is obscure to the
population at large and nonintuitive, the defendant had a reasonable
opportunity to learn about it .... We want people to familiarize them-
selves with the laws bearing on their activities. But a reasonable oppor-
tunity doesn't mean being able to go to the local law library and read
Title 18. It would be preposterous to suppose that someone from Wil-
son's milieu is able to take advantage of such an opportunity. If none
of the conditions that make it reasonable to dispense with proof of
knowledge of the law is present, then to intone "ignorance of the law is
no defense" is to condone a violation of fundamental principles for the
sake of a modest economy in the administration of criminal justice. 46
Chief Judge Posner also found fault with the Department of Jus-
tice's failure to publicize the existence of Section 922(g)(8), including
the failure to advise "the state judiciaries of it so that judges could
warn defendants in domestic-relations disputes." Judge Posner found
that the government's response on this issue represented a tacit admis-
sion that "four years after the enactment of the law, the word hadn't
gotten out even to judges. 4 7
46. Id. at 293-95 (dissent of Chief Judge Posner).
47. "If you're a judge in the process of returning a firearm because a protection
order has expired or been vacated, are you aware that you must first determine that the
person is not prohibited under any state or federal law from possessing firearms?"
asks Assistant U.S. Attorney Laura A. Przybylinski Finn in her article Those Convicted
of Domestic Violence Cannot Possess Firearms, Wisconsin Lawyer (August, 1999). See
also State v. S.A., 675 A.2d 678 (New Jersey, Super. A.D. 1996), where state appellate
court determined that state judge should not have ordered return of defendant's
firearms because it was illegal under federal law for defendant to possess the
firearms.. But see United States v. Beavers, 206 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
529 U.S. 1121 (2000), where the defendant argued that he should not be convicted of
a Section 922(g)(9) violation because the state had authorized the return of his pistol
to his possession after his conviction of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.
The Beavers court held that this state action in returning the pistol did not render the
federal prosecution of Beavers unconstitutional as applied. The Court stated: "the
state of Michigan is under no obligation to update state-law violators on recent
additions to federal law." Although state courts can be appropriate forums in which
federal crimes are tried, see Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407 (1973)
(recognizing the contrary sentiments expressed in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539,
615-16 (1842)); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178-79, 112 S. Ct. 2408,
2430, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) ("Federal statutes enforceable in state courts do, in a
sense, direct state judges to enforce them, but this sort of federal 'direction' of state
judges is mandated by the text of the Supremacy Clause."), this is apparently not the
294 [Vol. 23:283
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Relying heavily on Judge Posner's dissent, a federal district judge
dismissed an indictment, charging a violation of Section 922(g)(8),
concluding that this section is "an obscure, highly technical" statute
that violated due process for failing to require proof that defendant
knew he was violating the statute.48 And in United States v. Ficke,49 a
federal district court judge applied Judge Posner's analysis to a Section
922(g)(9) prosecution. In dismissing the indictment the district judge
noted that the defendant had no way of knowing that mere possession
of hunting firearms had become felonious conduct two years after his
misdemeanor conviction "unless he spent considerable time in law
libraries keeping track of amendments to federal firearms statutes, a
highly unlikely scenario considering the defendant's educational
background.
5 0
One commentator has suggested that the U.S. Supreme Court, in
a series of opinions over the past sixteen years, has followed an
unstated rule in ignorance of the law cases that is consistent with the
case with regard to the Lautenberg Amendment. Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 13 F.
Supp. 811 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (no federal mandate that states assist in the regulation and
enforcement of Section 92 2(g)(9)). For a discussions of state enforcement of federal
criminal law, see Donald H. Zeigler, Twins Separated at Birth: A Comparative History of
the Civil and Criminal Arising Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts and Some
Proposals for Change, 19 Vt. L. Rev. 673, 709-720 (Spring, 1995); Warren, Federal
Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 545 (1925); Note, Utilization of
State Courts to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Development in Judicial
Federalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966 (1947).
48. United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999). The district
court was reversed by the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals on 16 October 2001. United
States v. Emerson, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir., 2001) (stating that firearms ownership is not
inherently evil or suspect, and thus, a certain mens rea is required to support weapons
conviction; however, necessary mens rea in this context does not require knowledge of
the law, but merely of the legally relevant facts-that is, defendant need not know that
his actions are unlawful, but only that he know he is engaging in the activity that the
legislature has proscribed). But see United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394 (6th Cir.
2000)(statute proscribing possession of firearms while subject to a domestic violence
order does not violate the Fifth Amendment in not requiring actual notice of the gun
prohibition); United States v. Kafka, 222 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (conviction did
not violate defendant's due process rights, even though only defendant's possession of
firearm was knowing, and he did not know that his possession violated the statute
under which he was convicted).
49. 58 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D.Neb. 1999). But see United States v. Beavers, 206 F.3d
706 (6th Cir. 2000)(firearms statute did not violate due process by failing to require
government to prove, as element of the offense, that defendant knew that his
possession of firearm was illegal, and state's actions in returning pistol to defendant
after his domestic violence conviction did not render application of federal statute
unconstitutional as to defendant).
50. 58 F. Supp. 2d 1071, at 1074 (D.Neb. 1999).
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analysis articulated by Judge Posner in his Wilson dissent.5I This anal-
ysis is also supported by some of the reported opinions that appear to
agree that ignorance of the law can sometimes be so reasonable as to
make prosecution unconstitutional-although in the case of those con-
victed of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, ignorance of Sec-
tion 922(g)(9) is not sufficiently reasonable.
[Ilt should not surprise anyone that the government has enacted legis-
lation in an attempt to limit the means by which persons who have a
history of domestic violence might cause harm in the future .... [Tihe
possession of a gun, especially by anyone who has been convicted of a
violent crime, is... a highly regulated activity, and everyone knows it.
No one can reasonably claim, we think, to be unaware of the current
level of concern about domestic violence; it is the subject of daily news
reports and other media attention. There is evidence, in addition, that
§ 922(g)(9) was the subject of considerable public scrutiny and discus-
sion both before and after its enactment. [lIn the present social cir-
cumstances, we believe that it is simply disingenuous for [the
defendant] to claim that his conviction under Section 922(g)(9)
involved the kind of unfair surprise that the fifth amendment prohibits.5 2
IV. CONCLUSION
It has been estimated that when the Lautenberg Amendment
became effective on September 30, 1996, at least one million new
felons were created instantaneously.5 3 Indeed, every year there must
be tens of thousands of new convictions for misdemeanor crimes of
domestic violence 54 that will forever bar those convicted from continu-
ing to possess firearms. Yet these individuals may never be told by the
court or by their attorneys that their continued possession of firearms,
although permitted by state law, violates federal criminal law.
51. John Shepard Wiley Jr., Not Guilty By Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability In
Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1021 (1999). See also footnote 42,
supra.
52. United States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966, 968-69 (8th Cir. 2000) (emphasis
added).
53. James Bovard, "Disarming Those Who Need Guns Most," Wall Street Journal,
Dec. 23, 1996, at 2 (the one million new felons were those who had previously been
convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors but who retained their firearms because
they never had notice of the new statute).
54. "Each year between 100,000 to 150,000 are convicted of misdemeanor
domestic violence offenses and more than 100,000 become subject to a restraining
order." Charles M. Watts, Jr., The Lautenberg Amendment: Should The Federal
Government Be Required To Notify State Governments And Citizens When It Enacts A
Malum Prohibitum Criminal Law Whose Punishment Is A Felony Resulting In Extended
Incarceration?, 12 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 234, 247 (2000).
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Thousands more are made subject to domestic violence protection
orders or are involuntarily committed-but with no notice of the
impact on their rights to continued possession of firearms.55
It does appear that the most effective way for subsections (4), (8)
and (9) of Section 922(g) of the Federal Gun Control Act to achieve the
statute's objective of reducing domestic homicide would be to properly
publicize its substance and that this has not been done. For instance,
with regard to subsections (8) and (9):
The Department of Justice in a combined effort with local authorities
could systematically comb through the criminal records and find the
name of everyone who has committed a misdemeanor crime of domes-
tic violence. The Department could then send notices to these people
requiring them to get rid of their firearms. Also, every judge handing
down a conviction for domestic violence should notify the guilty that
they are no longer allowed to have a gun for the rest of their lives.
Likewise, every judge issuing a restraining order should be required to
notify the recipient that they are not allowed to have a gun while under
the order. After these steps are taken, it would be appropriate to begin
to punish those who violate the law. The threshold where "ignorance of
the law is no excuse" could be justly applied will have been crossed.
The result of proceeding in this fashion would yield a lower rate of
homicide with the law informing and improving the conduct of the
citizens. 5
6
The same effort could be made with regard to those who have
been or will be involuntarily committed to a mental hospital-and who
are therefore subject to Section 922(g)(4). If these provisions of the
Federal Gun Control Act are indeed a needed law,57 then they deserve
significantly more effort devoted to their publication and
enforcement.58
55. Id.
56. Id. at 246-47.
57. And arguably they are. "In America, once every 15 seconds a woman is beaten
by her husband or boyfriend. Domestic abuse is the leading cause of injury among
women. Roughly 1500 women each year are killed by their abusive partner.
Furthermore, seventy percent of these victims are killed with a gun. In homes where
guns are present the overall risk of homicide being committed by a family member or
intimate partner is seven times greater than in homes where guns are not present. In
an effort to reduce this carnage .... the Lautenberg Amendment, [was] . . . passed to
specifically take guns out of the hands of domestic abusers." Id. at 236.
58. In his dissent in United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 294-95 (7th Cir. 1998)
cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1024 (1999), Chief Judge Posner states that the Office of the U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of Illinois had made no effort to advise the local
courts of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) and that there have been "perhaps fewer than 10"
prosecutions of 18 U.S.C. § 9 2 2 (g)( 8 ) nationwide in 6 years out of a possible 40,000
20011
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Attached below are copies of three documents that appear on the
Department of the Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(ATF) home page on the Internet:
(1) Open Letter From the Director Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms (http://www.atf.treas.gov/firearms/domestic/opltratf.htm);
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20226
OPEN LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS
The purpose of this letter is to provide the public with informa-
tion concerning a recent amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968.
This amendment makes it unlawful for any person convicted of a "mis-
demeanor crime of domestic violence" to ship, transport, possess, or
-receive firearms or ammunition. It also makes it unlawful for any per-
son to sell or otherwise dispose of a firearm or ammunition to any
person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the recipi-
ent has been convicted of such a misdemeanor.
As defined in the new law, a "misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence" means an offense that:
(1) is a misdemeanor under federal or state law; and
(2) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force,
or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or
former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with
whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohab-
iting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or
guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or
guardian of the victim.
This definition includes all misdemeanors that involve the use or
attempted use of physical force (e.g., simple assault, assault and bat-
tery), if the offense is committed by one of the defined parties. This is
true whether or not the State statute or local ordinance specifically
defines the offense as a domestic violence misdemeanor. For example,
a person convicted of misdemeanor assault against his or her spouse
would be prohibited from receiving or possessing firearms. Moreover,
violations per year. Professor Wiley, contends that publicity and notice should be a
standard feature of the enforcement of federal laws that prohibit conduct that is not
inevitably nefarious. Wiley, Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in
Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1021, 1092-94 (1999). See discussion
in footnote 42 supra.
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the prohibition applies to persons convicted of such misdemeanors at
any time, even if the conviction occurred prior to the new law's effec-
tive date, September 30, 1996. As of the effective date of the new law,
such a person may no longer possess a firearm or ammunition. How-
ever, a conviction would not be disabling if it has been expunged, set
aside, pardoned, or the person has had his or her civil rights restored
(if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil
rights under such an offense) AND the person is not otherwise prohib-
ited from possessing firearms or ammunition.
Individuals subject to this disability should immediately lawfully
dispose of their firearms and ammunition. We recommend that such
persons relinquish their firearms and ammunition to a third party,
such as their attorney, to their local police agency, or a Federal fire-
arms dealer. The continued possession of firearms or ammunition by
persons under this disability is a violation of law and may subject the
possessor to criminal penalties. In addition, such firearms and ammu-
nition are subject to seizure and forfeiture.
If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact your
local ATF office.
John W. Magaw
Director
(2) Open Letter to All State and Local Law Enforcement Officials
(http://www.atf.treas.gov/firearms/domestic/opltrleo.htm)
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20226
OPEN LETTER TO ALL STATE AND LOCAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
The purpose of this letter is to provide information to all State and
local law enforcement agencies regarding one specific aspect of the
recently enacted Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997
(the Act). One part of the Act amended the Gun Control Act of 1968
(GCA) to make it unlawful for any person convicted of a "misde-
meanor crime of domestic violence" to ship, transport, possess, or
receive firearms or ammunition. It also makes Tot unlawful for any
person to sell or otherwise dispose of a firearm or ammunition to any
person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the recipi-
ent has been convicted of such a misdemeanor. This new prohibition
does apply to all law enforcement officers.
20011 299
17
Fowler: Ignorance of the Law: Should it Excuse Violations of Certain Fede
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2001
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
Act adds new firearms disability
As defined in the GCA, a "misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
lence" means an offense that:
(1) is a misdemeanor under Federal or State law; and
(2) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force,
or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or
former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with
whom the victim shares a child in common' by a person who is cohab-
iting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse , parent, or
guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or
guardian of the victim.
This definition includes all misdemeanors that involve the use or
attempted use of physical force (e.g., simple assault, assault and bat-
tery) if the offense is committed by one of the defined parties. This is
true whether or not the State statute or local ordinance specifically
defines the offense as a domestic violence misdemeanor. For example,
a person convicted of misdemeanor assault against his or her spouse
would be prohibited from receiving or possessing firearms or ammuni-
tion. Moreover, the prohibition applies to persons convicted of such
misdemeanors at any time, even if the conviction occurred prior to the
new law's effective date, September 30, 1996. As of the effective date of
the new law, such a person may no longer possess a firearm or ammu-
nition. However, with respect to all persons, a conviction would not be
disabling if it has been expunged, set aside, pardoned, or the person
has had his or her civil rights restored (if the law of the applicable
jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil right-s-under such an offense)
AND the person is not otherwise prohibited from possessing firearms
or ammunition.
(3) Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence Questions and
Answers (dated April 28, 1997); located at:
(http://www.atf.treas.gov/firearms/domestic/qa.htm).
MISDEMEANOR CRIME OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
As of April 28, 1997
1. WHAT IS A MISDEMEANOR CRIME OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE?
As defined in the Gun Control Act of 1968, a "misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence" means an offense that:
(1) is a misdemeanor under Federal or State law;
(2) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or
the threatened use of a deadly weapon; and
300 [Vol. 23:283
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(3) was committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian
of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in com-
mon, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the
victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situ-
ated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.
However, a person is not considered to have been convicted of a misde-
meanor crime of domestic violence unless:
(1) the person was represented by counsel in the case, or knowingly
and intelligently waived the right to counsel in the case; and
(2) in the case of a prosecution for which a person was entitled to a
jury trial in the jurisdiction in which the case was tried, either-
(a) the case was tried by a jury, or
(b) the person knowingly and intelligently waived the right to
have the case tried by a jury, by guilty plea or otherwise.
In addition, a conviction would not be disabling if it has been
expunged or set aside, or is an offense for which the person has been
pardoned or has had civil rights restored (if the law of the jurisdiction
in which the proceedings were held provides for the loss of civil rights
upon conviction for such an offense) unless the pardon, expunction,
or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not
ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms, and the person is not oth-
erwise prohibited by the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceed-
ings were held from receiving or possessing firearms.
2. WHAT IS THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISABILITY?
The law was effective September 30, 1996. However, the prohibi-
tion applies to persons convicted of such misdemeanors at any time,
even if the conviction occurred prior to the new law's effective date.
3. DOES THE NEW DISABILITY APPLY TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS?
Yes. The Gun Control Act of 1968 was amended so that employees
of Government agencies convicted of qualifying misdemeanors would
NOT be exempt from this new disability with respect to their receipt or
possession of firearms or ammunition. Thus, law enforcement officers
and other Government officials who have been convicted of a disquali-
fying misdemeanor may not lawfully possess or receive firearms or
ammunition for any purpose, including performance of their official
duties. This disability applies to firearms and ammunition issued by
Government agencies, firearms and ammunition purchased by Gov-
ernment employees for use in performing their official duties, and per-
sonal firearms and ammunition possessed by such employees.
4. Is THIS PROVISION OF THE LAW BEING APPLIED RETROACTIVELY IN
VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
2001] 301
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No. This provision is not being applied retroactively or in violation
of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. This is because the law
does not impose additional punishment upon persons convicted prior
to the effective date, but merely regulates the future possession of fire-
arms on or after the effective date. The provision is not retroactive
merely because the person's conviction occurred prior to the effective
date.
5. WHAT IS THE PENALTY FOR VIOLATING THIS OFFENSE?
Any individual who knowingly violates this provision of the law is
subject to a fine of $250,000, imprisonment of up to 10 years, or both.
6. DOES THE LAW IMPOSE ANY ADDITIONAL DUTIES ON DEALERS IN FIRE-
ARMS AND AMMUNITION?
Yes. Until the Form 4473 and Brady forms have been revised to
include the new offense, licensees should inquire of their customers
whether they have been convicted of a disqualifying domestic violence
misdemeanor and avoid transferring any firearms or ammunition to
such persons. ATF is in the process of revising the forms and will pro-
vide them to licensees as soon as possible.
7. WHAT SHOULD A LICENSEE DO IF HE HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF A
MISDEMEANOR CRIME OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE?
Federal firearms licensees should verify that they are disabled
under the new prohibition. A licensee convicted of a disqualifying mis-
demeanor may not lawfully possess firearms or ammunition. In addi-
tion, a licensee who incurs firearms disabilities during the term of a
license may not continue operations under the license for more than
30 days after incurring the disability unless the licensee applies for
relief from Federal firearms disabilities.
8. WHAT SHOULD A PERSON DO IF HE HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF A MISDE-
MEANOR CRIME OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE?
Individuals subject to this disability should immediately lawfully
dispose of their firearms and ammunition. ATF recommends that such
persons transfer their firearms and ammunition to a third party, such
as their attorney, to their local police agency, or a Federal firearms
dealer. The continued possession of firearms or ammunition by per-
sons under this disability is a violation of law and may subject the
possessor to criminal penalties. In addition, such firearms and ammu-
nition are subject to seizure and forfeiture.
9. X WAS CONVICTED OF MISDEMEANOR ASSAULT ON OCTOBER 10,
1996. THE CRIME OF ASSAULT DOES NOT MAKE SPECIFIC MENTION OF DOMES-
TIC VIOLENCE, BUT THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT REFLECTS THAT X ASSAULTED
HIS WIFE. MAY X STILL POSSESS FIREARMS OR AMMUNITION?
No. X may no longer possess firearms or ammunition.
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10. X WAS CONVICTED OF THE SAME CRIME ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1996,
10 DAYS BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE NEW STATUTE. HE POSSESSES A
FIREARM ON OCTOBER 10, 1996. MAY X LAWFULLY POSSESS FIREARMS?
No. If a person was convicted of a crime at any time, he or she may not
lawfully possess firearms or ammunition on or after September 30,
1996.
11. WHAT STATE AND LOCAL OFFENSES ARE "MISDEMEANORS" FOR PUR-
POSES OF 18 U.S.C. ° 922(D)(9) AND (G)(9)?
"Misdemeanor" as used in 18 U.S.C. sections 922(d)(9) and (g)(9)
includes any offense that is classified as a misdemeanor under Federal
or State law. In addition, the definition includes any state or local
offense punishable only by a fine or by imprisonment for a term of one
year or less.
12. IN DETERMINING WHETHER A CONVICTION IN A STATE COURT IS A
"CONVICTION" OF A MISDEMEANOR CRIME OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOES
FEDERAL OR STATE LAW APPLY?
State law applies. If a conviction for a qualifying misdemeanor
does not occur under State law, the person has not been "convicted" of
a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The law states that a per-
son must be convicted of a State misdemeanor to be under firearms
disabilities. Therefore, if the State does not consider the person to be
convicted, the person would not have Federal firearms disabilities.
13. Is A PERSON WHO RECEIVED "PROBATION BEFORE JUDGMENT" OR
SOME OTHER TYPE OF DEFERRED ADJUDICATION SUBJECT TO THIS DISABILITY?
What is a conviction is determined by the law of the jurisdiction
in which the proceedings were held. If the State law where the proceed-
ings were held does not consider probation before judgement or
deferred adjudication to be a conviction, the person would not be sub-
ject to Federal firearms disabilities.
14. ARE LOCAL CRIMINAL ORDINANCES "MISDEMEANORS UNDER STATE
LAW" FOR PURPOSES OF SECTIONS 922(D)(9) AND (G)(9)?
Yes, assuming a violation of the ordinance meets the definition of
"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" in all other respects.
15. X WAS CONVICTED OF MISDEMEANOR ASSAULT ON OCTOBER 10,
1996. THE CRIME OF ASSAULT DOES NOT MAKE SPECIFIC MENTION OF DOMES-
TIC VIOLENCE BUT THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT REFLECTS THAT HE ASSAULTED
HIS WIFE. MAY X STILL POSSESS FIREARMS OR AMMUNITION?
No. X may no longer possess firearms or ammunition.
16. X WAS CONVICTED OF THE SAME CRIME ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1996,
10 DAYS BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE NEW STATUTE. HE POSSESSES A
FIREARM ON OCTOBER 10, 1996. MAY X LAWFULLY POSSESS FIREARMS?
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No. If a person was convicted of the crime at any time, he or she
may not lawfully possess firearms or ammunition on or after Septem-
ber 30, 1996.
17. OFFICER C WAS CHARGED WITH FELONY ASSAULT ON HER CHILD IN
1989. SHE PLED GUILTY TO A MISDEMEANOR AND THE FELONY CHARGE WAS
DISMISSED. SHE WAS SUSPENDED FROM THE POLICE FORCE AND ORDERED TO
UNDERGO COUNSELING. AFTER SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE COUNSEL-
ING, SHE WAS REINSTATED. MAY OFFICER C LAWFULLY POSSESS FIREARMS OR
AMMUNITION?
No. Officer C may no longer lawfully possess firearms or ammunition
either on or off duty.
18. ARE CONVICTIONS FOR MISDEMEANOR CRIMES OF DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE ENTERED BY AN INDIAN TRIBAL COURT DISQUALIFYING UNDER 18
U.S.C. 922 (D) (9) AND (G) (9)?
Convictions for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence entered
by "tribal courts" are not disqualifying under 18 U.S.C. 922 (d) and
(g) (9) since the statute expressly refers to federal and state court con-
victions, but does not reference tribal court convictions. However,
Courts of Indian Offenses operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
under 25 C.F.R. Part 11 are federal instrumentalities. Therefore, con-
victions for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 922 (d) and (g) (9).
Note: For one who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence, the prohibition on the possession of firearms and
ammunition DOES not apply if the-individual has received a pardon
for the crime, the conviction has been expunged or set-aside, or the
person has had civil rights restored (if there was a loss of civil rights)
AND the person is not otherwise prohibited from possessing firearms
or ammunition.
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